The National Crime (Interim) Agency Bill (No. XVIII of 2026)

Independent Legal Commentary and Proposed Amendments

The National Crime (Interim) Agency Bill, No. XVIII of 2026

Official Bill reviewed: 16 October 2026
Scope: 20 clauses across six Parts
Related work: NCA Legislative Amendment Package 2026, particularly Phase V (Clauses 1–20) and Phase VI (Consolidated Proposed Legislative Text)

A temporary institution must not become a route around permanent constitutional safeguards

The establishment of a National Crime Agency is a significant institutional reform. Preparing such an agency requires careful attention to recruitment, organisational structures, operational procedures, technology, financial arrangements and the transfer of responsibilities from existing institutions.

A transitional agency can therefore serve a legitimate administrative purpose.

However, the National Crime (Interim) Agency Bill 2026 raises a fundamental question:

Should an institution established to prepare a permanent crime-fighting agency be allowed to determine its future leadership, organisational structure and operational systems before the permanent statutory safeguards take effect?

The distinction between preparation and the exercise of public power is essential.

This commentary examines the proposed legislation with the objective of supporting an orderly transition while ensuring that temporary arrangements do not compromise institutional independence, individual rights or parliamentary accountability.

1. The scope of the Interim Agency: Clauses 2–3

Clause 3 establishes the National Crime (Interim) Agency and authorises functions and powers considered necessary or desirable to facilitate the commencement of the permanent NCA.

The general purpose is understandable. However, the expression permitting measures that are necessary or desirable provides a relatively broad statutory mandate.

A temporary institution should be permitted to prepare administrative systems, coordinate transitional arrangements, undertake lawful procurement and develop proposals for the future Agency.

It should not acquire investigative, surveillance, interception, arrest or other coercive powers merely because those activities are considered useful for establishing the permanent institution.

Proposed amendment: Define the Interim Agency's mandate expressly as preparatory, administrative and transitional. Exclude the conduct of criminal investigations, live intelligence operations and coercive investigative measures unless separately and expressly authorised by law.

2. Appointment of the Interim Director-General: Clause 4

Clause 4 provides that the Director-General is appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.

The Prime Minister also determines the appointment's terms and conditions.

The Bill declares that the Director-General shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority.

While the recognition of independence is welcome, the appointment process and the determination of employment conditions should be examined alongside the office-holder's considerable influence over establishing the permanent NCA.

The concern becomes especially significant when clause 4 is considered alongside clause 19(3) of the permanent National Crime Agency Bill, which provides that the Interim Director-General becomes the first permanent Director-General.

Proposed amendment: Require transparent eligibility criteria, an objective selection process, published appointment requirements and defined tenure and removal safeguards.

Most importantly, appointment as Interim Director-General should not automatically confer appointment to the permanent office.

3. Protecting existing investigations: Clause 5

Clause 5 permits the Interim Director-General to evaluate or inquire into the administrative and operational functions of the Financial Crimes Commission and to request information and assistance.

Importantly, clause 5(2) expressly prevents the Interim Director-General from directing the FCC or other investigative bodies and from interfering in ongoing investigations.

This is a constructive safeguard and should be retained.

However, requests for operational information must be managed carefully to ensure that the confidentiality and integrity of ongoing proceedings are protected.

Proposed amendment: Clarify that information-sharing is limited to legitimate transition planning, subject to data protection, access controls and confidentiality.

The Interim Agency should not acquire unrestricted access to live investigative files, intelligence sources or privileged material merely because it is preparing the permanent institution.

4. Recruitment, staffing and employment safeguards: Clauses 6–7

The Bill permits the employment or designation of officers for the Interim Agency and authorises the Director-General to organise the recruitment of Directors and NCA Secretariat officers.

Recruitment is one of the most consequential functions of an institution being established.

Appointments made during the transitional period may influence the Agency's independence, competence and internal culture for many years.

Proposed amendment: Require open and merit-based recruitment, objective qualifications, documented selection decisions, conflict-of-interest rules and appropriate independent scrutiny.

Preparatory recruitment should not bypass appointment procedures intended to apply under the permanent National Crime Agency legislation.

The legitimate employment rights of officers seconded or transferred from existing institutions must also be protected.

5. Experts and foreign investigators: Clause 8

Clause 8 allows the Director-General to retain the services of experts, consultants and specialised bodies from Mauritius or abroad, including foreign investigators.

International expertise can be valuable when establishing a specialised investigative agency, particularly in cybersecurity, digital forensics, financial intelligence and organised-crime investigation.

However, the status and permissible functions of such personnel should be clear.

Proposed amendment: Require written terms of reference, confidentiality undertakings, conflict-of-interest declarations and appropriate controls over access to sensitive information.

Experts and consultants should not exercise coercive or investigative powers merely by virtue of their appointment under this transitional provision.

6. Organisational structure of the permanent NCA: Clause 9

Clause 9 provides that the Interim Director-General shall establish the organisational structure of the permanent NCA.

This provision requires reconsideration.

There is a material difference between designing or recommending an organisational structure and exercising final statutory authority to establish it.

The permanent Agency's structure should be consistent with the legislation governing its functions, governance, accountability and staffing.

Proposed amendment: Authorise the Interim Director-General to prepare and recommend the proposed organisational structure, subject to the lawful approval mechanisms applicable to the permanent Agency.

Transitional planning should not predetermine decisions properly reserved for the permanent institution.

7. Guidelines, standing orders and Codes: Clause 10

The preparation of operational guidance before an agency begins functioning is appropriate.

However, guidelines and Codes must not become a substitute for statutory authority.

Proposed amendment: Clarify that documents prepared during the interim period are drafts and do not independently authorise investigations, surveillance, interception, arrest or any other coercive activity.

Their eventual adoption should comply with the permanent NCA legislation, including the applicable governance and oversight procedures.

8. National Flagging Database: Clause 11

Clause 11 directs the Interim Director-General to put in place the National Flagging Database.

This is one of the most sensitive provisions of the Bill.

The database envisaged by the permanent NCA legislation involves the recording and monitoring of entities of interest, potentially including individuals, properties, vehicles and other identifying information.

A database of this nature requires statutory safeguards concerning lawful purpose, inclusion criteria, access, accuracy, retention, correction, deletion and independent oversight.

Proposed amendment: Restrict the Interim Agency to technical design, security assessment, procurement and testing with synthetic or appropriately anonymised data.

Live operational entries and covert markers should not be activated before the permanent statutory safeguards, lawful authorisation procedures and independent oversight arrangements are in force.

9. Operational coordination with the Police: Clause 12

Clause 12 requires the preparation of an Operational Protocol with the assistance of the Commissioner of Police.

Such a protocol is important to prevent institutional confusion, duplication of investigations and disputes over operational responsibilities.

However, a protocol cannot alter the Constitution or confer powers beyond those established by Parliament.

Proposed amendment: Provide that the Operational Protocol must preserve the constitutional responsibilities of the Commissioner of Police, the independence of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the statutory functions of other investigative bodies.

It should clearly regulate the transfer of investigations, the handling of evidence, information-sharing, accountability and the resolution of jurisdictional disagreements.

The Protocol must not independently create powers that require express legislative authority.

10. Surveillance and Interception Code: Clause 13

Clause 13 provides for preparation of a Surveillance and Interception Code of Practice with the assistance of the Commissioner of Police.

The protection of information obtained through covert sources, intrusive surveillance and interception is critically important.

Nevertheless, a Code governing the handling of information does not, by itself, provide a complete legal framework for authorising intrusive techniques.

Proposed amendment: Ensure that the Code addresses necessity, proportionality, authorisation, access restrictions, secure storage, retention, disclosure, destruction, audit and handling of legally privileged communications.

The preparation of the Code during the interim period must not permit surveillance or interception before the applicable statutory powers and safeguards come into effect.

11. Financial arrangements and accountability: Clauses 14–16

The Bill establishes an Interim Agency Fund and provides for estimates of income and expenditure, annual reporting and audited accounts.

These are necessary accountability measures.

However, transitional expenditure may involve significant recruitment, procurement, technology and consultancy commitments.

Proposed amendment: Require transparent budgeting and clear audit trails, with major procurement and consultancy decisions subject to defined approval and conflict-of-interest controls.

Annual reporting should identify significant transition expenditure, staffing decisions, systems developed and major implementation activities, subject to lawful confidentiality requirements.

12. Audit provisions and drafting consistency: Clause 17

Clause 17 appoints the Director of Audit as auditor of the Interim Agency, which is an appropriate accountability safeguard.

However, clause 17(3) refers to the first financial year of the National Crime Agency rather than the Interim Agency.

This wording requires correction or explanation.

The proposed disapplication of section 7(1) of the Statutory Bodies (Accounts and Audit) Act during the first financial year also merits careful reconsideration.

Proposed amendment: Correct the institutional reference and ensure that appropriate audit and reporting obligations apply from the commencement of the Interim Agency.

A transitional institution should not operate with weaker financial scrutiny simply because its existence is intended to be temporary.

13. Confidentiality and protected disclosures: Clause 18

Clause 18 imposes confidentiality obligations on Interim Agency officers.

Such duties are legitimate given the possibility that staff will handle sensitive administrative, employment, financial and operational information.

However, the provision does not expressly identify exceptions for lawful reporting to Courts, auditors, oversight authorities or other competent bodies.

Proposed amendment: Preserve confidentiality while expressly recognising disclosures required or authorised by law, protected reporting of suspected wrongdoing, legal professional privilege and cooperation with independent oversight bodies.

Confidentiality must protect legitimate institutional interests without becoming an obstacle to accountability.

14. Consequential amendment: Clause 19

Clause 19 proposes including the Interim Agency in the Schedule to the Statutory Bodies (Accounts and Audit) Act.

This is a necessary consequential provision supporting the financial-accountability structure.

Recommendation: Retain the provision, subject to consistency with the final institutional and audit arrangements.

15. Commencement and expiry of the Interim Agency: Clause 20

Clause 20 provides that the legislation will come into operation on a date fixed by Proclamation.

It does not establish an independent maximum duration for the Interim Agency.

The permanent National Crime Agency Bill envisages repeal of the Interim Agency legislation, but that arrangement depends upon the implementation and commencement of the permanent statutory framework.

A temporary institution should have a clearly defined end point.

Without a statutory maximum duration, transitional structures may persist longer than originally intended.

Proposed amendment: Introduce an express sunset provision, with a defined maximum duration and any extension subject to parliamentary approval.

The earlier Phase V technical proposals recommend an initial maximum duration of 12 months, with one possible extension not exceeding six months, subject to parliamentary approval.

The legislation should also ensure the lawful transfer or disposal of personnel records, contracts, property, sensitive data and other obligations when the Interim Agency ceases to operate.

16. The connection between Bills XVI, XVII and XVIII

These three Bills cannot be considered in isolation.

The Constitution (Amendment) Bill, No. XVI of 2026, proposes a permanent constitutional appointment framework while allowing a special procedure for appointing the first NCA Director-General.

The National Crime Agency Bill, No. XVII of 2026, provides for the Interim Director-General to become the first permanent Director-General.

The National Crime (Interim) Agency Bill, No. XVIII of 2026, establishes the temporary appointment route.

Read together, these provisions create a particularly important constitutional and institutional question:

Could the temporary appointment mechanism effectively determine who occupies a permanent and constitutionally protected office?

Parliament should address this question directly.

The first appointment must command the same public confidence, independence and legitimacy as all subsequent appointments.

Conclusion: Temporary authority must remain temporary

Mauritius needs a capable National Crime Agency, supported by competent personnel, modern technology and sound organisational arrangements.

The establishment of an Interim Agency can help achieve that objective.

However, the transition must be governed by clear legal boundaries.

An interim institution should prepare the foundations of a permanent agency, not exercise powers that properly belong to that agency before its legal safeguards are operative.

It should not determine permanent leadership through an appointment process that bypasses the safeguards intended for the permanent office.

It should not operate a live intelligence database without a complete legal framework.

And it should not remain in existence indefinitely without renewed parliamentary authorisation.

A temporary institution must prepare the exercise of public power, not become an alternative route to exercising it without the safeguards Parliament intends to establish.

The proposals outlined here are consistent with the independent six-phase NCA Legislative Amendment Package prepared in September 2026.

They are intended to support effective crime-fighting institutions, constitutional legality, administrative integrity and public confidence.

Strong institutions require strong foundations. Strong powers require strong safeguards.

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Editorial note: This independent commentary is based on the National Crime (Interim) Agency Bill, No. XVIII of 2026, dated 16 October 2026. It is not an official Government amendment or statement of the law currently in force. It should be read alongside Bills XVI and XVII and the associated legislative proposals.

Dave Kissoondoyal
LL.M. (Cyberlaw) | MBA (Information Systems)
Founder, Mauritius.Name